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This paper analyzes one-good exchange economies with two inﬁnitely-lived agents and incomplete mar-
kets. It is shown that there are no recursive (Markov) equilibria for which borrowing (debt) constraints never
bind if the state space of exogenous and endogenous variables is a compact subset of I R
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large enough (but ﬁnite) borrowing limits, no recursive equilibrium with compact state space exists. These
non-existence results hold for any economy satisfying the following standard assumptions: preferences are
additively separable across time and states; the one-period utility function is time- and state-independent
and unbounded from below; endowments are bounded and follow a Markov chain (ﬁnite support) with sta-
tionary transition matrix; there is some idiosyncratic risk and no aggregate risk. The same non-existence
results hold for any number of agents if in addition the marginal utility functions of all agents are convex.
Finally, non-existence holds for any number of agents and any Markov endowment chain (with or without
aggregate risk) if all agents have identical utility functions of the CRRA-type (homothetic preferences) with
degree of relative risk aversion greater than or equal to one.
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A large part of macroeconomics deals with recursive equilibria (Markov equilibria) in
recursive economies (Cooley and Prescott, 1995, Stokey and Lucas, 1989, Ljungqvist and
Sargent, 2000). For exchange economies with one inﬁnitely-lived agent, Lucas (1978) has
shown the existence of recursive equilibria (RE) with a state space that only contains exoge-
nous variables. For exchange economies with a ﬁnite number of inﬁnitely-lived agents and
incomplete markets, Duﬃe, Geanakoplos, Mas-Collel, and McLennan (1994) have shown the
existence of RE with a compact state space that includes the exogenous variables and the
endogenous variables consumption, asset prices, and portfolio holdings. In order to prevent
agents from entering into Ponzi schemes, Duﬃe et.al. (1994) introduce an explicit borrow-
ing (short-sale) constraint that may bind in equilibrium.1 For the same class of economies,
Hernandez and Santos (1996), Levine and Zame (1996), and Magill and Quinzii (1994,1996)
have shown the (generic) existence of sequential equilibria (not necessarily recursive) with
explicit borrowing constraints that never bind in equilibrium. This paper asks whether the
same is true for RE. That is, can we ﬁnd RE (the focus of Duﬃe et.al., 1994) with explicit
borrowing constraints that never bind (the focus of Hernandez and Santos,1996, Levine and
Zame,1996, and Magill and Quinzii,1994,1996)?2
A RE is deﬁned by a state space, a law of motion for the endogenous state variable(s),
1This terminology follows Magill and Quinzii (1994) and most of the macroeconomic literature. Duﬃe
et.al. (1994) only consider assets in positive net-supply and rule out short-selling (borrowing) by assumption.
For this type of borrowing constraint, they prove the existence of a stationary (ergodic) Markov equilibrium
(ME), which implies the existence of a stationary (ergodic) RE. See Duﬃe et.al. (1994) and this paper for
a discussion of the relationship between RE and ME. Becker and Zilcha (1997) prove the existence of a
stationary equilibrium for production economies with only aggregate productivity shocks (no idiosyncratic
risk), no borrowing, and an endogenous state space that contains only the wealth distribution.
2The introduction of ad-hoc borrowing (short-sale) constraints by Duﬃe et.al. (1994) is reminiscent of
Radner’s (1972) lower bound on short-sales to ensure existence of equilibrium in ﬁnite-horizon economies,
which was subsequently criticized by Hart (1975). Notice, however, that in contrast to Hart (1975) the
non-existence result discussed in this paper is not caused by an asset demand (demand for borrowing) that
goes to inﬁnity when the borrowing constraint is gradually relaxed.
1and a (vector-valued) function mapping current states into current outcomes (Cooley and
Prescott, 1995). Similarly, a Markov equilibrium (ME) is deﬁned by a state space (self-
justiﬁed set) and an expectations correspondence (Duﬃe et.al., 1994). Thus, the state space
is one of the basic ingredients of a RE (ME). This paper shows that for a large class of
exchange economies with incomplete markets, the state space cannot be a compact subset of
IR
n if borrowing constraints never bind (and all functions are continuous). In other words,
no RE (ME) with compact state space and non-binding borrowing constraints exists. In
particular, no RE (ME) with ﬁnite state space and non-binding borrowing constraints exists
even if the Markov process of exogenous variables has ﬁnite support. From the non-existence
of RE (ME) with compact state space and non-binding borrowing constraints it follows that
for large enough (but ﬁnite) borrowing limits, no RE (ME) with compact state space exists.
Put diﬀerently, as we gradually relax the explicit borrowing constraints used by Duﬃe et.al.
(1994) to prevent Ponzi schemes, we move from existence to non-existence.
Both Duﬃe et.al. (1994) and the computational literature on RE with incomplete markets
(Aiyagari, 1994, Huggett, 1993, Lucas and Heaton, 1996, and Krusell and Smith, 1998)
conﬁne attention to RE (ME) with explicit borrowing constraints and compact state space.3
This paper shows that under the maintained assumption of a compact state space, the
explicit borrowing constraint used by Duﬃe et.al. (1994) and the computational literature
is necessarily ad-hoc in the sense that it always prevents a solvent agent from borrowing
an additional dollar at some date-event. In other words, the borrowing constraint always
introduces a market imperfection in addition to market incompleteness, and this literature
has therefore relied on a framework that does not allow for a clear separation of market
incompleteness from other market imperfections. Furthermore, any future work on the
3The compactness of the state space is essential for many of the arguments put forward in Duﬃe et.al.
(1994). In particular, the existence of a RE (ME) with compact state space implies, under an additional
convexity assumption on the expectations correspondence, that a stationary (ergodic) RE (ME) exists. The
convexity assumption is satisﬁed for the class of economies analyzed in this paper.
2existence of RE (ME) with non-binding borrowing constraints must either abandon the
compactness assumption (and therefore go beyond the methods discussed by Duﬃe et.al.,
1994) or change the deﬁnition of RE.4
The basic non-existence argument for an economy without aggregate risk runs as follows.
First, for utility functions that are unbounded from below, zero consumption can never
be an equilibrium outcome.5 Second, for equilibria with strictly positive consumption and
non-binding borrowing constraints, market clearing and agents’ ﬁrst-order conditions (Euler
equations) taken together imply that if one agent’s equilibrium consumption attains its mini-
mum (maximum), then consumption of this agent must be equal to this minimial (maximal)
value for all future dates (and future shock realizations). Third, no agent’s equilibrium
consumption can be constant if markets are incomplete. In other words, the temporary
equilibrium conditions require that future consumption is constant once minimal (maximal)
consumption is achieved, but the condition of overall equilibrium (the present value budget
constraint) requires that consumption always exhibits some ﬂuctuations. Thus, minimal
consumption can never be achieved. If the consumption allocation is a part of the (endoge-
nous) state space, then this immediately implies the non-existence of RE with compact state
space. If the consumption allocation is not a part of the state space, then an additional
continuity assumption implies non-existence.6
4For example, Duﬃe et.al. (1994) require that the equilibrium conditions hold for all possible current
states (for all elements of the state space), which could be changed to the requirement that the equilibrium
conditions hold for almost all current states.
5One might conjecture that an Inada condition is suﬃcient to rule out zero consumption, but this conjec-
ture is not correct if an agent’s initial debt is so large that his initial choice set is a singleton. See footnote 7
for a more detailed discussion of this issue. In the case of CRRA-preferences, the unboundedness assumption
means that the degree of relative risk aversion is greater than or equal to one. Risk aversion coeﬃcients
between one and four are the focus of the computational literature (Aiyagari, 1994, Huggett, 1993, Lucas
and Heaton, 1996, and Krusell and Smith, 1998).
6The argument has the ﬂavor of the reasoning employed by Atkeson and Lucas (1992) and Thomas and
Worrall (1990) to show that the (constrained)-eﬃcient cross-sectional distribution of consumption diverges
in economies with private information. Their analysis, however, conﬁnes attention to economies with a
3The non-existence result shown in this paper holds for any two-agent incomplete-markets
economy satisfying the following standard assumptions: preferences are additively-separable
across time and states and one-period utility functions are time- and state-independent;
the endowments are bounded and follow a Markov chain (ﬁnite support) with stationary
transition matrix; there is some idiosyncratic risk and no aggregate risk. Moreover, this paper
follows Duﬃe et.al. (1994) and assumes that the one-period utility function is unbounded
from below. If in addition the marginal utility functions of all agents are convex, then
the non-existence result holds for any number of agents. Finally, non-existence holds for
any number of agents and any Markov chain of endowments (with or without aggregate
risk) if agents have identical homothetic preferences (CRRA utility functions) with degree
of relative risk aversion greater than or equal to one, the case most frequently encountered
in macroeconomics.
Clearly, the class of economies analyzed in this paper is non-pathological. Hence, it is not
the structure of the economy, but the structure of the equilibrium concept in conjunction
with the compactness assumption that is driving the non-existence result. Indeed, for the
same class of economies, Duﬃe et.al. (1994) prove the existence of RE (ME) with ad-hoc
borrowing constraints (no borrowing) and compact state space. Further, if there is only one
agent or markets are complete, there are RE with ﬁnite (and therefore compact) state space
and non-binding borrowing constraints (Lucas, 1978, and this paper), namely the equilibria
corresponding to the Pareto eﬃcient consumption allocations.
There are several papers dealing with the issue of non-existence of RE (Markov equilib-
ria) in general equilibrium models. For OLG economies with multiple goods, Spear (1985)
has shown that no RE (Markov equilibrium) with ﬁnite state space exists. For economies
with inﬁnitely-lived agents and incomplete markets, Kehoe and Levine (2001) and Kuebler
continuum of agents and constant interest rate, whereas this paper’s focus is on economies with ﬁnitely-
many agents and possibly time-varying interest rate (asset price).
4and Schmedders (2001) show (generic) non-existence of RE when the state space only con-
tains the exogenous state (ﬁnite state space). Kuebler and Schmedders (2002) provide a
numerical example (one particular economy) of non-existence of RE with non-binding bor-
rowing constraints (but not necessarily compact state space) when the endogenous part of
the state space includes the wealth distribution, but in contrast to this paper they argue
that non-existence is related to multiplicity of equilibrium. Finally, Santos (2000) discusses
the non-existence of RE in a deterministic economy with externalities.
II. The Model
a) The Economy
We consider a discrete-time, inﬁnite-horizon exchange economy. The economy is populated
by two (types of) inﬁnitely-lived agents. Time is indexed by t =0 ,1,2,... and agents by
i =1 ,2.
There is an exogenous Markov process, {st}, with state space, S, and stationary transition
function π. W ed e n o t eat y p i c a le l e m e n to fS by st or simply s. A (partial) history of
exogenous states up to time t is denoted by st =( s0,s 1,...,s t) ∈ St+1 and the probability
that st+1 ∈ S (respectively s  ∈ S ) occurs in period t +1i fst ∈ S (respectively s ∈ S)
has occured in period t is denoted by π(s |s) (respectively π(st+1|st)) . Finally, we assume
that in period 0 one state, s0, occurs with probability one. In the formal analysis we assume
that S is ﬁnite, S ≡{ 1,...,S}.T h a ti s ,{st} is a Markov chain. Each Markov chain, {st},
with initial state s0, state space S, and transition matrix π induces an event tree with nodes
(date-events) st in the canonical way. We denote the set of successors of st by D(st).
We assume that the exogenous state space is the Cartesian product of two sets, S ≡ Σ×Z,
so that s =( σ,z). Below we introduce the assumption that asset payoﬀs, one-period utility
5functions, and endowments are independent of σ. Thus, we can interpret z as a fundamental
shock and σ as a signal (news). If π(z |σ,z) depends non-trivially on σ, the signal is useful in
predicting future fundamentals. Otherwise, the signal is a sunspot variable. The introduction
of an additional signal variable, z, generalizes the non-existence result and also helps relate
the present framework to the framework used by Duﬃe et.al.,1994 (see below).
There is one perishable consumption good. Agent i s initial endowment of the consump-
tion good (labor income) is deﬁned by a (time-invariant) function ei : Z → IR + whose values
are denoted by ei(z). The function ei in conjunction with the Markov shock process induces
a Markov endowment process in the canonical way.
A consumption plan of agent i is a sequence of functions, {cit},w i t hcit : St+1 → IR +.
The value, cit(st), of the function cit is simply the consumption level of agent i at node
st =( s0,s 1,...,s t). We restrict consumption choices to the space of all sequences that are
bounded in the sup-norm:  {cit}  = supt,stcit(st) < ∞. Clearly, a consumption plan can
also be deﬁned as one function mapping nodes, st, into consumption levels, ct(st). Since the
set of all nodes is countable, this means that the consumption space can be identiﬁed with
l∞
+ .











where π(st)=π(st|st−1)π(st−1|st−2)...π(s1|s0) (recall that only one state, s0, occurs with
positive probability in period 0). In (1) we assumed that the pure discount factor, β,i st h e
same for both agents. Although this assumption is not essential for our non-existence result,
it shortens the proofs and provides for a simple benchmark (constant consumption) in the
complete-market case with no aggregate risk.
6There is one long-lived asset in positive net-supply. The asset is real in the sense that it
promises the delivery of (state-contingent) quantities of the good. The asset payoﬀ structure
is described by a time-invariant function, d : Z → IR +, with values denoted by d(z). At time
t = 0, agent i has an initial asset endowment of θi0 ∈ I R, which is not a choice variable. We
normalize the aggregate supply of the asset to one: θ10 + θ20 =1 .
In short, an economy E =< S,π,β,u,e,θ 0,d>consists of a Markov process with ﬁnite
state space S and stationary transition matrix π, preferences deﬁned by a common discount
factor β and one-period utility functions u = u1,...,u I, endowments deﬁned by functions
e = e1,...,e I and initial values θ0 = θ10,...,θ I0, and asset payoﬀs deﬁned by functions
d = d1,...,d I.
We make the following assumptions on endowments and preferences:
Assumption 1. All transitions have strictly positive probability: π(s |s) > 0 ∀s,s .T h e r e
is some risk, that is, there exist shocks z,z  with ei(z)  = ei(z ). Asset payoﬀs are always
strictly positive: ∀z : d(z) > 0.
Assumption 2. Each agent’s one-period utility function, ui :I R++ → I R, is twice con-
tinuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave, and unbounded from below.
Remark 1. The assumption π(s |s) > 0 ensures that all nodes have a positive probability
of occurrence. Thus, we do not have to distinguish between statements that hold for all
nodes and statements that hold almost surely. Notice that we do not impose a positivity
assumption on net-endowments, θi0+ei(z), because our non-existence result does not require
it. The unboundedness assumption on utility is also made by Duﬃe et.al. (1994) and ensures
that zero consumption is never an equilibrium choice. See footnote 7 for a discussion why
the alternative assumption of an Inada condition might not suﬃce for the non-existence
argument. CRRA-preferences with a coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion greater or equal to
7one have the property that the utility function is unbounded from below.
The basic argument for non-existence makes the following assumption:
Assumption 3. There is no aggregate risk: d(z)+e1(z)+e2(z)=ω.
Finally, we state an assumption which rules out that the trading of one asset is suﬃcient
to implement the (Pareto eﬃcient) constant allocation when there are two agents. Clearly,
this assumption is generically satisﬁed.
Assumption 4. Markets are eﬀectively incomplete: there are no numbers c1,θ 1 with
0 <c 1 <ωso that c1 − e1(z)=d(z)θ1 for all z a n dn on u m b e r sc2,θ 2 with 0 <c 2 <ωso
that c2 − e2(z)=d(z)θ2 for all z.
b) Equilibrium
Agents have the opportunity to trade the asset in a sequence of competitive markets. Let
qt stand for the price of one unit of the asset in period t and θit for agent i s beginning-
of-period holding (before asset trading) of the asset in period t. The asset price system is
deﬁned by a sequence of functions, {qt},w i t hqt : St+1 → IR +. A portfolio (trading) plan of
agent i is a sequence of functions, {θit},w i t hθi,t+1 : St+1 → I R. To rule out Ponzi-schemes,
we introduce an explicit debt (borrowing) constraint, M ≥ 0. Thus, a budget-feasible
consumption and portfolio plan has to satisfy the following sequential budget constraint
augmented by an explicit borrowing constraint:
∀t,s
t : cit(s








We adopt the convention θi0(s−1)=θi0 so that equation (2) also holds for t =0 .
The are several ways of ruling out Ponzi-schemes, and imposing an explicit bound on
8debt, M, is one alternative. However, for large enough M the set of equilibria implied by (2)
is the same as the set of equilibria that would result if one of the alternatives discussed in
Hernandez and Santos (1996), Levine and Zame (1996), and Magill and Quinzii (1994,1996)
was chosen. For example, Hernandez and Santos (1996) show that six diﬀerent ways of
writing down the budget constraint lead to the same budget set (and therefore the same set
of equilibria) if asset prices and payoﬀs are arbitrage-free and if the expected present value








Introduce the functions θt+1 : St+1 → IR
2 with θt+1(st)=( θ1,t+1(st),θ 2,t+1(st)) and
ct : St+1 → IR
2
+ with ct(st)=( c1t(st),c 2t(st)).
The following deﬁnition of a sequential equilibrium (SE) is standard:
Deﬁnition 1. For an economy E =< S,π,β,u,e,θ 0,d>, a sequential equilibrium (SE)
is a list of sequences, {qt},{ct},{θt}, so that:
i) For given asset prices {qt}, the consumption and trading plan, {cit},{θit},o fe a c ha g e n ti
maximizes expected life-time utility (1) subject to the sequential budget constraint (2).
ii) Market clearing (3) holds.
With the assumptions made so far (concave utility and convex choice set), a standard
argument shows that Euler equations and transversality condition together are suﬃcient
conditions for individual utility maximization. Although we allowed for the possibility of
unbounded asset prices and portfolio choices, below we show that in equilibrium they will be
bounded, which implies that any transversality condition is automatically satisﬁed. Hence,
in equilibrium the Euler equation is a suﬃcient condition for individual utility maximization.
Further, in equilibrium the Euler equation holds with equality when borrowing constraints
9are not binding because the unboundedness of utility from below rules out zero consumption
as an equilibrium choice.7 To summarize, a SE with non-binding borrowing constraints is a
list of bounded sequences, {qt},{ct},{θt}, solving (goods market clearing is implied by asset
market clearing and the budget constraint)
∀i,∀t,s
t : cit(s




















We now turn to a discussion of recursive equilibria (RE). Introduce an endogenous state
space X with elements x and time-invariant functions, f : X × S2 → X, q : X × S → IR +,
c : X × S → IR
2
+,a n dθ : X × S → IR
2. For simplicity, we assume that θt is always one
component of xt. Since this paper shows the non-existence of RE, this assumption is without
loss of generality. The functions f,q,c,θ in conjunction with an initial condition (x0,s 0)
generate (deﬁne) sequences {xt}, {qt}, {ct},a n d{θt} through the recursive formula
xt+1(s
t+1)=f(xt(s










The function f describes the law of motion for the endogenous state variable(s).
To simplify notation, we will assume that xt only contains “current“endogenous variables,
that is, we assume that the largest possible endogenous state is xt is xt =( qt,c t,θ t). However,
7Since we do not require net-endowments to be strictly positive, zero consumption could arise in equilib-
rium even if the utility function satisﬁes an Inada condition (but is bounded from below): if an agent begins
his life with so much debt that his net-endowment is zero, θi0 + ei(z0) = 0, then his choice set at the initial
node is a singleton and no Euler equation has to hold for this agent at the initial node (any further increase
in debt will violate the budget constraint and the agent is forced to consume ci0 =0 ) .
10the non-existence results proved in this paper immediately extend to the case in which xt
contains a ﬁnite number of current and past endogenous variables and a ﬁnite number of
past shocks.
When the point of departure is the notion of SE, it seems tempting to deﬁne a recursive
equilibrium (RE) as a SE, {qt},{ct},{θt}, generated by the recursive formula (5) and an
initial condition (x0,s 0). However, in this paper we deﬁne a RE as a family of SE, namely
the family of SE generated by the recursive formula (5) when any (x,s) ∈ X × S is a possible
initial state. We therefore introduce the following concept of a RE:
Deﬁnition 2. For an economy E =< S,π,β,u,e,θ 0,d>, a recursive equilibrium (RE) is
a family of SE generated by a set of initial conditions, X × S, and time-invariant functions
f,q,c,θ with domain X × S.
Most work of the work on RE (see, for example, Prescott and Cooley, 1995) immediately
formulates the individual optimization problem in terms of the corresponding Bellman equa-
tion, which automatically implies that a RE corresponds to a family of SE (in accordance
with the above deﬁnition). Put diﬀerently,the solution to the Bellman equation corresponds
to a family of solutions to the corresponding optimization problem, one (in our case of strictly
concave utility function and convex choice sets) for each initial condition. In addition to this
“mathematical reason“, there are at least two “non-mathematical“reasons for not identify-
ing a RE with one SE for a ﬁxed initial state. First, such a deﬁnition would imply that a
RE depends on the initial condition, and therefore exhibits some sort of inﬁnite memory.
Second, the set of possible future realizations of the state may explicitly depend on time,
again a feature which seems to run counter to the notion of recursivity.
Each RE deﬁnes a (time-homogeneous) joint Markov process over endogenous and ex-
ogenous variables. Such a Markov process satisfying all equilibrium conditions is called a
11Markov equilibrium (Duﬃe et.al., 1994). Duﬃe et.al. (1994) do not deﬁne a Markov equi-
librium indirectly through a RE, but directly through a state space and an expectations
correspondence. If one allows for signal variables, σt, then any Markov equilibrium can be
represented as a RE (Duﬃe et.al., 1994).
The previous literature has studied the following special cases of the general framework.
In the case of one representative agent (Lucas, 1978) or complete markets (proposition
1 below), there are RE for which equilibrium consumption and asset prices only depend
on the exogenous state s, and for which the portfolio holdings of the long-lived asset are
constant. Thus, we can choose as state space the exogenous set S, which is ﬁnite and therefore
compact. The quantitative literature on incomplete markets (Aiyagari, 1994, Heaton and
Lucas, 1996, Huggett, 1993, Krusell and Smith, 1998) in general uses a minimal endogenous
state space, that is, the only endogenous state variable is the wealth distribution: xt = θt
or xt = qt−1θt. Moreover, the possibility of additional signal variables is often neglected
(st = zt). Finally, Duﬃe et.al. (1994) use xt =( θt,c t,q t) as the endogenous state of the
economy (they also include θt+1 in the current state, but this diﬀerence is inessential). For
this choice of a state, Duﬃe et.al. (1994) prove the existence of a (stationary, conditionally
spot-less) Markov equilibrium, which implies the existence of a (stationary) RE with law
of motion xt+1 = f(xt,z t,z t+1,σ t) and functions c, q,a n dθ deﬁned by the corresponding
projections (Duﬃe et.al., 1994).
III. Two Agents and No Aggregate Risk
We begin with two positive results on the existence question:
Proposition 1. Suppose the economy E =< S,π,β,u,e,θ 0,d>satisﬁes A1-A3.
i) For the debt constraint M =0(no borrowing) there exists a RE with compact, ﬁnite-
dimensional state space (and possibly binding borrowing constraints).
12ii) If markets are eﬀectively complete (A4 does not hold), then there is a debt constraint M<
∞ so that a RE with ﬁnite (and therefore compact) state space and non-binding borrowing
constraints exists.
Proof .
i) Follows from Duﬃe et.al.(1994) who prove that if short-sales of assets are prohibited (M =
0), a (stationary) Markov equilibrium with compact state space exists if xt =( θt,c t,q t,z t),
which implies the existence of a RE with compact state space (see the above remark).
ii) Assume ﬁrst that there exist c1,θ 1 ∈ IR w i t h 0 <c 1 <ωso that c1 − e1(z)=d(z)θ1 for
all z. Let equilibrium consumption be c1(s)=c1 <ωand c2(s)=ω − c1. By construction,
this allocation satisﬁes goods market clearing. If we let asset prices be the unique bounded







 |s) , (6)
then each agent’s Euler equation also holds. Suppose portfolio choices are constant θi(s)=θi.
In this case, the budget constraint of agent 1 reads ∀z : c1 −e1(z)=d(z)θ1. By assumption,
there exists a θ1 so that this equation holds. If we choose θ2 =1− θ1, the asset market
clears. By Walras’ law, the budget constraint of agent 1 is then satisﬁed. Choosing S as
the state space, state-invariant functions for consumption and portfolio allocations, and the
asset price function deﬁned by (6) , we have constructed a RE with ﬁnite (and therefore
compact) state space and non-binding borrowing constraints. If there are no numbers c1,θ
but numbers c2,θ 2 with 0 <c 2 <ωso that c2 − e2(z)=d(z)θ2 for all z, a similar argument
applies.
We now turn to the non-existence argument. The ﬁrst lemma establishes that asset
prices and portfolio holdings are bounded. The important point to note about lemma 1
is that the bounds are independent of the debt constraint M. To state the lemma, deﬁne
(ei/d)min
. = min{ei(1)/d(1),...,e i(S)/d(S)}.
13Lemma 1. Suppose the economy E =< S,π,β,u,e,θ 0,d > satisﬁes A1-A3. Then for
any SE (with or without binding borrowing constraints) we have:
i) There are q > 0 and ¯ q<∞ so that ∀t,st : q ≤ qt(st) ≤ ¯ q . Moreover, q and ¯ q are
independent of the debt constraint M.
ii) For all debt constraints M and ∀t,st : θi,t+1(st) ≥− (ei/d)min .
Proof . The upper bound on the asset price is derived in Kehoe and Levine (2001). They
consider an economy with a debt constraint M = 0, but their proof immediately extends to
the case with any ﬁnite borrowing constraint. Similarly, we could use the result that for the
economy considered here, there are no bubbles for long-lived assets in positive net-supply
(Santos and Woodford, 1997). This upper bound on asset prices depends on preferences and
endowments, but not on M.
To construct a strictly positive lower bound, ﬁx an equilibrium and the corresponding
optimal plan of both agents. If at node st we have qt(st)=q, then the fact that agent i is
















If the inequality (7) did not hold, agent i s plan could not be optimal because it would pay
to buy one unit of the asset at node st and to hold this additional unit forever consuming
the dividend payments. Deﬁne dmin = min{d(1),...,d(S)}.S i n c eci,t+n(st+n) ≤ ω for both









This establishes the strictly positive lower bound on the asset price.
The lower bound on portfolio holdings, −(ei/d)min, follows from the sequential budget
constraint (2) and non-negativity of consumption. More speciﬁcally, if agent i s portfolio
14holding drops below this bound, there is a history for which the corresponding sequence
of portfolio holdings is unbounded from below, which violates any ﬁnite debt constraint
because the asset price is bounded away from zero. To be more precise, notice ﬁrst that







t−1) < −ε. (9)




Let ˆ s be the state for which ei(ˆ s)/d(ˆ s)=( ei/d)min and consider a history s∞ with sˆ t =
sˆ t+1 = ... =ˆ s.I f θiˆ t(s
ˆ t−1) < (ei/d)min ,t h e na ts
ˆ t the inequality (10) holds for small
enough ε>0s i n c eqt(s
ˆ t) ≤ ¯ q<∞. Hence, θi,ˆ t+1(s
ˆ t) − θiˆ t(s
ˆ t−1) <ε . Moreover, this
and θiˆ t(s
ˆ t−1) < (ei/d)min imply that (10) also holds for the subsequent node s
ˆ t+1 for the
same ε. More generally, (10) holds for all s
ˆ t+n,n =1 ,2,... and ﬁxed ε, and the portfolio
sequence, {θit(st)}, associated with this history is therefore unbounded from below. Since
the asset price is bounded away from zero, this implies that the corresponding sequence of
debt, {qt(st)θi,t+1(st)}, is unbounded from below, therefore violating the debt constraint for
any debt constraint M at some t = ˆ t + T.
The next two lemmas (lemma 2 and 3) state two properties of the equilibrium consump-
tion set of any SE. The ﬁrst lemma says that equilibrium consumption cannot be constant.
The proof uses the Euler equation and budget constraint. The second lemma shows that if
one agent’s equilibrium consumption takes on its minimum (maximum) at one node, then it
has to be equal to this minimum (maximum) for all subsequent nodes. The proof uses the
Euler equation and market clearing. These two lemmas (2 and 3) imply that the equilibrium
consumption set of any RE cannot be compact (lemma 4), which immediately leads to the
non-existence of RE (proposition 2 and corollary 1).
15To state the next two lemmas, deﬁne for each SE the set of all possible consumption levels
of agent i : Ci
. = {ci ∈ IR +|∃st : cit(st)=ci}. Deﬁne further the supremum ci,sup
. = supCi
and inﬁmum ci,inf
. = inf Ci, which always exist since Ci is a bounded subset of I R.
Lemma 2. Suppose the economy E =< S,π,β,u,e,θ 0,d > satisﬁes A1-A4. Then for
any SE with non-binding borrowing constraints, individual consumption displays some ﬂuc-
tuations: the set Ci is not a singleton.
Proof . Suppose not, that is, there is a real number ci so that cit(st)=ci for all st.N o t i c e
ﬁrst that solving the Euler equations forward yields the standard present value representation

































w h e r ew ea d o p t e dt h ec o n v e n t i o n
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k=1 xk = 1. Using the fact that portfolio holdings are




















[ci − ei(zt+n)] . (13)




















Notice that (14) holds because asset payoﬀs and prices are bounded away from zero and
bounded from above. Since the right-hand-side of (13) neither depends on st−1 nor explicitly
on t, equation (13) says that portfolio choices are time- and state-independent: θit(st−1)=¯ θi
for all st−1. In this case the sequential budget constraint reads
∀zt : ci − ei(zt)=d(zt)¯ θi , (15)
which does not hold because of A4.
Remark 2. Lemma 2 also shows that for the incomplete-markets economy analyzed in
this paper, the equilibrium is never eﬃcient. Kuebler and Schmedders (2001) analyze a
framework more general than the model considered in this paper, and show that for a
generic set of economies (which might not contain the constant-aggregate-endowment case)
the equilibrium is Pareto ineﬃcient.
The next lemma contains the paper’s main idea: if consumption attains one of the extreme
points of the equilibrium consumption set, then it has to stay there forever. The argument
heavily relies on the fact that ﬁrst-order conditions (Euler equations) have to hold with
equality when consumption is strictly positive and borrowing constraints are not binding.
Lemma 3. Suppose the economy E =< S,π,β,u,e,θ 0,d > satisﬁes A1-A3. Then for
any SE with non-binding borrowing constraints, minimal (maximal) consumption for agent
i at a particular node implies minimal (maximal) consumption at all subsequent nodes: for
any SE, if there exists a node st so that cit(st)=ci,inf,t h e nci,t+n(st+n)=ci,inf for all
subsequent nodes st+n ∈ D(st); for any SE, if there exists a node st so that cit(st)=ci,sup,
then ci,t+n(st+n)=ci,sup for all subsequent nodes st+n ∈ D(st).
17Proof . Fix a SE. If borrowing constraints do not bind, the Euler equations are given by







For any st,t h et w om e a s u r e sπ(.|st)a n d˜ π(.|st) are equivalent measures because asset prices













Clearly, (16) are the Euler equations for a one-period, risk-free bond.
Suppose now that there is a st with c1t(st)=c1,inf. Fix this node st. Because of market
clearing and the assumption of no aggregate risk, we also have c2t(st)=c2,sup. Since marginal
utility functions are non-increasing in consumption, the Euler equations (16) at st imply
i) qt(s
t) ≤ β (17)
ii) qt(s
t) ≥ β.
In words: the fact that agent 1 expects an increase in consumption (he has hit bottom)
imposes an upper bound on the asset price (a lower bound on the interest rate) and the fact
that agent 2 expects a decrease in consumption imposes a lower bound on the asset price
(an upper bound on the interest rate).
Clearly, (17) only holds if qt(st)=β. But then the Euler equations (16) imply c1,t+1(st+1)=
c1,inf for all st+1 ∈ D(st)a n dc2,t+1(st+1)=c2,sup for all st+1 ∈ D(st). This must hold for
all st+1 ∈ D(st) because of assumption A1 (all transition probabilities are strictly posi-
tive) and the fact that π and ˜ π are equivalent measures. An identical argument shows that
c1,t+2(st+2)=c1,inf for all st+2 ∈ D(st)a n dc2,t+2(st+2)=c2,sup for all st+2 ∈ D(st). More
generally, c1t(st)=c1,inf implies c1,t+n(st+n)=c1,inf for all st+n ∈ D(st)a n dc2t(st)=c2,sup
implies c2,t+n(st+n)=c2,sup. An analogous argument shows that c1t(st)=c1,sup implies
18c1,t+n(st+n)=c1,sup for all st+n ∈ D(st)a n dc2t(st)=c2,inf implies c2,t+n(st+n)=c2,inf for
all st+n ∈ D(st).
The ﬁnal lemma combines lemma 2 and 3 to derive that a statement about the nature
of RE. In order to state the lemma, deﬁne for a particular RE the equilibrium consumption
set of agent i as ˜ Ci
. = {ci ∈ IR + |∃(x,s) ∈ X × S : ci(x,s)=ci}. Clearly, the equilibrium
consumption set of a RE is the union of the equilibrium consumption sets of those SE
associated with the RE.
Lemma 4. Suppose the economy E =< S,π,β,u,e,θ 0,d>satisﬁes assumptions A1-A4.
Then for any RE with non-binding borrowing constraints, the equilibrium consumption set,
˜ Ci, is not compact (closed).
Proof. Suppose not, that is, suppose ˜ Ci is compact. Then ˜ Ci contains its supremum:
˜ ci,sup ∈ ˜ Ci. Put diﬀerently, there exists a state (ˆ x, ˆ s) ∈ X × S with ci(ˆ x, ˆ s)=˜ ci,sup.E a c h
RE is associated with a family of SE, one for each initial state, (x0,s 0) ∈ X × S.F o rt h eS E
with initial state (x0,s 0)=( ˆ x, ˆ s), we have that ci,sup =˜ ci,sup, which implies that in this SE
consumption of agent i in period t = 0 must be maximal: ci0 = ci(x0,s 0)=˜ ci,sup = ci,sup.
Lemma 3 then implies that for this particular SE, consumption of agent i is maximal in all
subsequent periods: cit(st)=ci,sup ∀st. But this contradicts lemma 2.
Proposition 2. Suppose the economy E =< S,π,β,u,e,θ 0,d > satisﬁes A1-A4. Then
there is no RE with non-binding borrowing constraints that is deﬁned by continuous functions,
f,q,c,θ, on a compact domain,X × S .
Proof. The equilibrium consumption set, ˜ Ci, is the image set of the consumption policy
function, ci : X × S → IR +. If this function is continuous with compact domain, its image
set is compact. This contradicts lemma 4.
Using lemma 1, we can rephrase proposition 2 as follows:
19Corollary 1. Suppose the economy E =< S,π,β,u,e,θ 0,d > satisﬁes A1-A4. Then
there is no RE with debt constraint M>¯ qm a x {(e1/d)min,(e2/d)min} that is deﬁned by
continuous functions, f,q,c,θ, on a compact domain, X × S.
Proof. Lemma 1 says that for arbitrary, but ﬁnite, debt constraint, M, agent i will only
choose a portfolio plan that satisﬁes qt(st)θi,t+1(st) ≥− qt(st)(ei/d)min for all st.T h u s ,w e
have qt(st)θi,t+1(st) ≥− ¯ q(ei/d)min for all st. This means that for any M>¯ q(ei/d)min, agent
i s borrowing constraint never binds. But if the borrowing constraint never binds, then
proposition 2 says that no RE exists.
Remark 3. If β1  = β2, then the proof of non-existence follows similar lines. The proofs of
lemma 2 and 3 go through without change, and lemma 4 is replaced by the statement that
either ci,sup / ∈ Ci or ci,inf / ∈ Ci.
IV. Extensions
In this section, we discuss possible extensions of the non-existence argument. We begin
with the extension to more than two agents. The deﬁnition of SE and RE provided in
section 2 immediately extends to the case of any ﬁnite number, I, of agents. Although the
non-existence result stated below also applies to economies with a continuum of agents, to
save space the argument is presented for the case of a ﬁnite number of agents. Clearly, with
the exception of lemma 3, all results derived in the last section still hold for more than two
agents. The analog of lemma 3 for the case of more than two agents is:
Lemma 5. Suppose the economy E =< S,π,β,u,e,θ 0,d>satisﬁes A1-A3 and there are
at least two agents, I ≥ 2. If the marginal utility function, u 
i, of each agent i =1 ,...,I
is convex, then in any SE with non-binding borrowing constraints, minimal consumption for
one agent i at a particular node implies minimal consumption for this agent at all subsequent
20nodes: for any SE, if there exists a node st so that cit(st)=ci,inf,t h e nci,t+n(st+n)=ci,inf
for all subsequent nodes st+n ∈ D(st).
Proof. Without loss of generality, we choose i = 1. Fix a SE with non-binding borrowing
constraints and suppose there exists a node st for which c1t(st)=c1,inf.W eﬁ xt h i sn o d est
throughout the analysis. After introducing an equivalent measure, the Euler equations at st
are given by (16). The Euler equation for agent i = 1 again implies
qt(s
t) ≤ β. (18)








The proof of (19) is shown below. Since the marginal utility function is non-increasing and


















Clearly, (18) and (20) can only hold if qt(st)=β, which implies c1,t+1(st+1)=c1,inf for all
st+1 ∈ D(st). An identical argument shows that c1,t+2(st+2)=c1,inf for all st+2 ∈ D(st).
More generally, c1t(st)=c1,inf implies c1,t+n(st+n)=c1,inf for all st+n ∈ D(st).

























t+1) − c1,inf , (22)












Clearly, (23) can only hold if (19) holds.
Proposition 2 and the corollary 1 now read as follows:
Proposition 3. Suppose the economy E =< S,π,β,u,e,θ 0,d>satisﬁes A1-A4 and there
are at least two agents, I ≥ 2. If agents’ marginal utility functions are all convex, then there
is no RE with non-binding borrowing constraints that is deﬁned by continuous functions,
f,q,c,θ, on a compact domain, X × S.
Corollary 2. Suppose the economy E =< S,π,β,u,e,θ 0,d> satisﬁes A1-A4 and there
are at least two agents, I ≥ 2. If agents’ marginal utility functions are all convex, then
there is no RE with debt constraint M>¯ qm a x {(e1/d)min,...,(eI/d)min} that is deﬁned by
continuous functions, f,q,c,θ, on a compact domain, X × S.
Next we discuss an assumptions on preferences that leads to non-existence for all endow-
ment vectors (including those with a large amount of aggregate risk). Interestingly, this is
the preference assumption most often made in macroeconomics.
Assumption 5. Agents have identical CRRA-preferences with degree of relative risk aver-
sion greater or equal to one: ui(cit)=c
1−γ
it /(1 − γ), γ>1,o rui(cit)=logcit.
Proposition 4. Suppose the economy E =< S,π,β,u,e,θ 0,d > satisﬁes assumptions
A1,A2,A4, and A5 (but not necessarily assumption A3) and there are at least two agents,
I ≥ 2. Then there is no RE with non-binding borrowing constraints that is deﬁned by
22continuous functions, f,q,c,θ, on a compact domain, X × S.
Proof . With this preference speciﬁcation, the equilibrium conditions (5) for an economy
with aggregate risk can be transformed into the equilibrium conditions of an economy with
constant (unit) aggregate endowment and eﬀective discount factor ˜ β = βω
−γ
t . Simply in-
troduce the scaled variables ˜ cit = cit/ωt,˜ eit = eit/ωt, ˜ dt = dt/ωt,a n d˜ qt = qt/ωt.T h i sn e w
economy is an economy with no aggregate risk and common, multiplicative taste shocks,
which has no recursive equilibrium with non-binding borrowing constraints for the following
reason. Step 1 (lemma 3) goes through because constant consumption still implies constant
portfolio holdings (even though it does not imply constant prices), which in turn violates
the budget constraint. Step 2 (lemma 4) remains almost unchanged because common taste
shocks disappear from the equilibrium conditions once an appropriate equivalent measure is
introduced. Because for this preference speciﬁcation the marginal utility function is strictly
convex, proposition 3 applies and the non-existence holds for any number of agents.
Corollary 3. Suppose the economy E =< S,π,β,u,e,θ 0,d > satisﬁes assumptions
A1,A2,A4, and A5 (but not necessarily assumption A3) and there are at least two agents,
I ≥ 2. Then there is no RE with debt constraint M>¯ qm a x {(e1/d)min,...,(eI/d)min} that
is deﬁned by continuous functions, f,q,c,θ, on a compact domain,X × S.
V. Concluding Remarks
This paper showed that for incomplete-market economies with no aggregate risk and
utility functions that are unbounded from below, no RE (ME) with compact state space and
non-binding borrowing constraints exists. This conclusion discusses possible extensions of
the non-existence result in addition to the extensions discussed in the previous Section.
A straightforward (but lengthy) extension of the argument put forward in this paper
23shows that the same type of non-existence result holds for an open set of economies with
small amount of aggregate risk. In other words, non-existence is robust with respect to
perturbations of endowments. For this type of extension, lemma 2 has to be sharpened to
the statement that there is a lower bound on consumption ﬂuctuations that is bounded away
from zero, and the new version of lemma 3 would state that future consumption ﬂuctuations
can be made arbitrarily small. An essential requirement for this argument to be valid is that
all functions involved are continuous functions restricted to a compact set, and are therefore
bounded. A similar extension is possible for small taste shocks.
The non-existence argument does not extend, however, to a non-compact state space
because this could lead to marginal utility functions that are unbounded even if restricted
to the equilibrium domain. Thus, this paper cannot rule out that there are RE (ME)
with non-compact state space and non-binding borrowing constraints for which the implied
equilibrium consumption set is ˜ C ≡{ (c1,c 2) ∈ IR
2
++|c1 + c2 = ω}.
In the case of bounded utility functions the contradiction leading to the non-existence
result might be avoided by including zero consumption in the equilibrium consumption set
as an isolated point. As mentioned in footnote 7, zero consumption could be an equilibrium
outcome even if an Inada condition is satisﬁed (but not with utility unbounded from below)
when an agent begins his life with so much debt that his net-endowment is zero: θi0+ei(z0)=
0. In this case the agent’s choice set at the initial node is a singleton and no Euler equation
has to hold for this agent at the initial node (any further increase in debt will violate the
budget constraint and the agent is forced to consume ci0 = 0). Clearly, such an approach to
the existence of RE (ME) requires one to abandon the common assumption (Hernandez and
Santos, 1996, Levine and Zame, 1996, Magill and Quinzii, 1994,96) that net-endowments are
strictly positive at all date-events.8
8To the best of my knowledge, RE (ME) of this type have not been studied by the literature.
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